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Law, Muteness and the Theatrical
Marett Leiboff
This short composition muses upon the possibilities that the theatrical
may offer as jurisprudence or legal theory. Its scope is necessarily
abbreviated, modest and confined, intended to inaugurate and not
foreclose …
In September 2002, the Brisbane-based Grin & Tonic Theatre
Troupe presented a theatricalised version of the ‘cult classic’ iconic
Japanese television series Monkey.1 Held in a riverside park, the only
thing keeping intruders out was a thin hessian wall that divided
the circus performance space from the public park. So it was with
absolute disquiet that these walls were breached, by a group of
‘bogans’ (an Australian term used to describe people more likely
to be found at the pub or the football than the theatre). Moreover,
they were yelling at each other and audience members, swilling
beer and disrupting audience members by pushing them out of
their seats. This unruliness and illegality caused consternation
amongst the audience members who were the direct recipients of
their attentions, some of whom remonstrated with the intruders
as ‘curtain up’ came closer. For the rest of us, responses ranged
from bemusement and irritation to amusement. When the bogans
breached the imaginary fourth wall constituting the stage, the light
came on (for some of us). But not everyone, as audience members
yelled for them to get out, and tried, without success, to attract the
attention of attendants and management.
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But the last laugh was on the audience, as the intruders moved
from transgressor in this space between audience and stage
to proclaim their legitimacy as rightful possessors of the
performance space. The light came on for all the audience,
as well as those who had already cracked it. This theatrical
rupture – the bogans were actors and the disruption part of
the production - turned the unsanctioned regulatory gesture
by audience members back onto themselves. It was they who
acted without legitimacy. The fourth wall had been breached
absolutely, the spectator now part of the production, as the
audience shuffled into embarrassed laughter, applause, and
mutterings, the illegality now thrown back onto them. The
audience was now enmeshed into the theatrical presence, were
part of the action.
But we (I include me as spectator and thus participant) had our
commonsense overborne, to a greater or lesser degree. Homeless
people lived in the park, but none of these bogans was homeless,
which begged the question why they would suddenly appear
under the hessian screen precisely at the moment they did. The
pub would surely have been a far more comfortable place than a
theatre. It simply didn’t stack up. Our physical response to the
danger, the threat, overwhelmed commonsense, and rationality
and reason was replaced by a viscerality created through this
theatrical presence.
This theatrical encounter didn’t conform to the conventions of
either the expected structure of the play, or the conventions attending
a theatre outing. Instead, the bogans not only interfered with audience
comfort, but it (audience) became spectacle rather than spectator. The
disrupted narrative meant some audience members came close to losing
the plot. And this is precisely the reason why disruptions of this sort
are used, in order to destabilise the expectations of the audience, to
comprehend theatre as life and life as theatre. This encounter was not
scripted (though it was, of course, in one sense), and any account or
description of what occurred could only ever be created ex post facto.
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This is my account of events; every other encounter would have
differed either that evening or at another performance, created from
the distinct vantage point, which was a physical and not intellectual
response. The encounter provoked a dangerous and transgressive
response borne out of the reading and misreading by the audience of
the textual conventions of their role, and when provoked, individual
spectators who would seemingly have prided themselves on their
education, their reason and rationality could so easily turn to a
fundamentally physical response. Theatre has always provoked the
visceral, through sanctioned carnivalesque-style licentiousness, to riot.2
These encounters challenge lawful boundaries; the audience became
lawless when they breached the conventions and boundaries of audience
politeness. The shift from a code or convention into actual lawlessness
threatened on this occasion. One of the audience members most
angered by the bogans became aggressive, but before a confrontation
could occur, the bogans/actors used this as a cue to avoid endangering
themselves, by simply shifting into the demi-circus of the performance
space and shifting into ‘character’. In doing so, they saved the spectator
from himself, but not before he had become spectacle.

This exchange from their location with the audience into the
performance space served as a double gesture. First, it transformed
the physical environment. By the mere movement of a couple of steps,
the power relations between themselves and the spectator changed
fundamentally. Second, it transformed them from illegitimate bogans
to legitimate actors. Not only did their esteem rise, but it implicitly
reproved the audience members, and in doing so, rendered them legally
impotent. The audience could do nothing in the face of the challenge
they had experienced, and the most aggressive of the spectators
submitted to the new power arrangement. While they caused no
physical harm, these audience members were now the transgressors,
having breached the laws of the audience, and their role (at least as
they would have understood it) as respectable members of an audience.
___________________________________
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This encounter encapsulates what I mean by the theatrical, or
as Sarrazac puts it: ‘theatricality reestablished the art of theater as
action' (Sarrazac 2002: 65-66). This conception of the theatrical
makes it apparent that communication, encounter and interaction
is not found in a script, or in a play or in a text. Indeed, it points to
the thing we assume, in terms of a legal account of human conduct,
that the narrative certainty and completeness with which we imagine
human interaction is simply artifice. Yet law assumes through its tests
and techniques that our actions and conduct, our behaviours and
practices, exist as text, as a narrative that is created with a beginning a
middle and an end. This account of human conduct presupposes and
presumes that even the most visceral of encounters exists through the
lens of a knowing, thinking subject. And while it is trite to recall that
decades of critical legal literatures have countered this presumption,
they do so from the starting point of the knowing person who may be
captured by their physical traits and subjectivities. Instead, law takes
extraordinary measures to impose narrative certainty, meaning, and
clarity on the sheer randomness and meaningless of the events, actions
and interactions that litter human existence, and as such assume the
existence of a literary necessity in everything that occurs.
What I am posing here is an alternative reading of interactions that
is premised on the theatrical in two dimensions. The first is the physical
encounter that is, fundamentally, a response of the body and not of
the mind, in order to challenge the legal imaginary of the knowing
individual. The second concerns the narrative and interpretative
practices that draw upon the existence of a literature that becomes
all knowing, and which disregards or fails to recognise the function
of the physical, visceral and corporeal in those interpretations. As
I am using it, however, I avoid using performance or performative
because each term implies a textuality beyond the body, a rationality or
perfection (Peters 2008). Peter Goodrich reminds us that the common
law is enigma, linguistic opacity, obscuring its substance or intention
(Goodrich 2010: 80, 86):
[A]ll texts, all laws, are enigmatic in the sense that they say more
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than they show … law cannot own all words, nor can law control all
the images that words store and unleash. For this reason the literal is
insufficient. The letter kills …’ (Goodrich 2010: 97).

The clash between res and verba (Leiboff 2007: 24-25, 28) creates
half-meanings, words divorced from speech and act, or more precisely,
speech and act regulated; as Foucault tells us, the body is always open
to discipline, but never open to truth.

The theatrical, in this sense, provides a device that is the exemplar
of a legal blind spot that insists on making sense of the un-sensible
(though this may also be insensible), that creates imagined narrative
certainties out of encounters that are suffused with the ineffability of
the moment. In short, the theatrical provides us with a means by which
we are forced to experience, are forced to acknowledge what is lived
at any given moment.

In order to conceive of, and understand the theatrical, however,
we must suspend any belief that we hold in the textual certainties of
drama, performed literature, play texts and the like. The significance of
the theatrical, as Sarrazac reminds us, is that it is not word dependent,
and more particularly, it is action. The encounters in the prologue to
Monkey show clearly the consequences that flow from action. Sure
enough, the actors would have rehearsed this scenario, but their quarry
never knew. In this sense, the artistic aspects of the theatrical stand
in the stead of the everyday. It condenses and distils in a particular
framed moment how each of us behaves, transacts and interacts in
reality. We function without a script for most of the time, without a
preformed narrative, and without a structure. This, I suggest, means
we live on the edge, forever open to the possibility that our encounters
will result in activities about which we will account afterwards, but
which we cannot know about beforehand (of course, there are clear
behaviours that do conform to a narrative, such as fraud, or instances
where intention is clearly found).
In short, the theatrical militates against law’s insistence that actions
and events are rendered according to the narrative and chronological
certainties of the Aristotelian well-made play; the idea that events occur
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because they are planned and intended or were always meant to come
to pass is the archetype of the legal account of events (and it must be
noted that Aristotle’s unities require dramatic action to exist in real
time). If these events fail to meet up to this expectation, law, through
its processes, will impose a dramatised narrative that conforms to
chronological events. The registers in which these narratives are created
cut across the sweep of legal endeavour from interview between solicitor
and client, to the hermeneutics of the common law.
Our dependence on literary conventions in law has recently been
explored in a developing literature on improvisation in law. Desmond
Manderson points out, in the context of musical improvisation and law,
that the ‘tyranny of the text’ that took hold in the 18th century has
resulted in a recent phenomenon: ‘Only in the past two hundred years
do we find analyses which problematize the practice [of improvisation],
distinguish improvised from non-improvised performance, and treat
any departure from a written text as a practice requiring justification
(Manderson: 2010). Yet even improvisation functions on the basis of
an existing text of one sort or another.

The theatricality of the kind I am considering here, as conceived
of by Meyerhold in the first part of the 20th century and Artaud in
the mid-20th century does not depend on texts (literary or otherwise).
Drawing, in the case of the former, on the traditions of carnival
and fairground, and in the latter, on Balinese puppet theatre, these
directors / theorists reconceptualised theatre from play and drama,
and the internalisation of self (in the Stanislavskian mode, popularised
through American style method acting). As Derrida noted, in his
exploration of Artaud’s theatre of cruelty, theatre ‘is life itself, in the
extent to which life is unrepresentable.’ (Derrida 1978: 8). Thus, the
theatrical is encounter, and a physical experiential encounter at that.
The theatrical expects us, requires us, to accept and respond to the
things that simply occur.
In the events that occurred in the encounters in the prologue
in Monkey, there was nothing other than the moment as lived,
encountered and created. But, of course, this is what was intended.
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The idea that an audience should, sitting comfortably, be entertained
without more, is not theatre, is not the theatrical. Drawing upon
Meyerhold and Artaud, among others, the mode of theatrical used
in Monkey references a ‘living theatre’ and Happenings, of the kind
created by Julian Beck and Richard Schechner (among others) in the
US in the 1960s and 1970s: a radicalising of the theatrical conventions
that rejected a conventional theatre of manners and well-made play, of
an evening out, of theatre as amusement and not theatre of encounter
and engagement (Brecht 1969). 3 As such, theatre is a living encounter
between spectator and audience, where law in the form of word
disintegrated in the face of bodily and visceral engagement. This model
of encounter breached the proscenium, the imaginary theatrical fourth
wall, both literally and figuratively.
The theatrical is dangerous, and its fleshly and visceral ruptures
are too primitive, too raw, so that its presences in the everyday are
reconfigured and above all uncontainable and untameable, kept under
lock and key in case it bursts out. Its fleshy corporeality is the stuff of
regulation and closure.

Notes
1

2

3

Monkey (TV series) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monkey_(TV_series).
The television series was based on Wu Cheng’en book: http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Journey_to_the_West.

At the opening of JM Synge’s Playboy of the Western World in 1907, a
riot ensued, caused in part by concerns relate to it morality (the celebration
of a murder) and the mode of its staging (women wearing underclothes on
stage).
For instance, Stefan Brecht’s account of the infamous ‘Dionysus in 69’
describes the author’s response to Schechner’s Performance Group’s
creation of Euripides The Bacchae
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